


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SREEGOPAL BASU MALLIK

FELLOWSHIP LECTURES

1907-1908.


VEDANTISM.

BY

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FOREWORD.



This small volume on Vedántism is mainly based on the Sree Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures delivered by me at the Senate House, Calcutta, during the Session 1907—1908.

The order and the titles of the Chapters in this book somewhat differ from those of the Lectures as delivered. But the substance of both is identical, and the difference in the form is due only to an effort to make the book readable.

Vedántism has been treated here as a critical system of thought that it really is, and not as a dogmatic mixture of cosmology and eschatology that it has been fancied to be by many recent writers on the subject.

I take this opportunity to thank my friend and pupil, Pándeya Jagannátha Prasáda, M.A., Kávyatírtha, for his suggestions and for his seeing the book through the press.

SENATE HOUSE,
Calcutta, Aug. 4, 1908. } RÁMÁVATÁRA ŚARMÁ.

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OR

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Sreegopal Basu Mallik

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VEDANTISM.

CHAPTER I.

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN THOUGHT.

By Vedántism we mean in these lectures the philosophical teachings of the early Upanishads as systematised by the Brahma-Sútras of Bádaráyana. The views of Bádaráyana's commentators and other mediæval and modern writers on Vedántism or cognate subjects are adopted here and there only with caution and reservation. The Brihadáranyaka and the Chhándogya, two of the earliest and most genuine Upanishads, fairly represent the Vedántic doctrine in its entirety. But these books as also some other Upanishadic texts deal with subjects which may be conveniently put under three heads :—1. The Historical section collecting the opinions of the pre-Upanishadic Philosophers, 2. The Mythical portion preserving the ancient tradition of the Vedic tribes, and 3. the real Vedántic teachings. This classification of the subject-matter of the Upanishads has not yet been definitely made. Modern writers on the subject have curiously enough neglected it altogether. Mediæval writers have divided the Upanishadic teachings into Jnána-Kánda, Karma-Kánda and Upásaná-Kánda. The ancient writers were half conscious of some similar distinction and in vain attempted to reconcile the contradictions arising out of the

confusion due to their not firmly grasping it. In fact the Upanishadic teachings in their originality represent the maturest stage in the development of the Indian thought and no sane mind can hold that the collected opinions and myths found in the Upanishads have any place in the Vedántic theory.

The earliest Indian thinkers like their fellows of Ionia devoted themselves mainly to cosmological speculations. Before the times of the Upanishads many solutions of the cosmological problem were suggested. The problem had two forms. Some thinkers busied themselves with the question—"From what has the world come"? Others asked themselves—"Into what does the world return"? Raikva's Samvarga-Vidyá described in the Chhándogya answers the question in the second form. Jánaśruti Pautráyana hears of a famous sage named Raikva and approaches him with precious gifts. He even offers his own daughter in marriage to the sage who is with much difficulty persuaded to accept the gifts and at last explains the Samvarga-Vidyá to his noble disciple. Like some of the early Ionic philosophers, the sage thought that the air was the Samvarga or covering into which everything disappeared and this implies most probably that every thing came out of the same *arche*, but the Samvarga-doctrine does not plainly state this fact. The Násadiya hymn of the Rígveda presumably much earlier than the Chhándogya undertook to solve the cosmological problem in the first form. The *arche* suggested by this ancient hymn is already very subtle.

It is something like Anaximander's *Apeiron* and appears to be the prototype of the Sāṅkhya conception of Prakṛiti. This hymn also refers to *salila*, *tamas*, *tapas* or water, Chaos and heat as the primal elements from which the world has evolved. But these appear to be later evolutions of that one (*Tad ekam*) which breathed without air (*Avātam*) through its self-sustaining power of Svadhá. But these were not the only solutions of the cosmological problem in those pre-Upanishadic ages. Many other answers were suggested and some sages even thought that the world had come out of nothing.

Such was the state of the Indian thought a little before the appearance of the Upanishads. The early Vedic Rishis had not looked upon the world as a whole. Different individual phenomena of the perceptual world or classes of such phenomena chiefly concerned them at that time. It was only towards the end of the Hymnal period that the Násadiya and other philosophical or quasi-philosophical Suktas appeared and the universe as a unitary existence presented itself to the Indian mind. But before the advent of the Upanishadic inspiration only stray and conflicting opinions about the origin and end of the world were expressed by individual sages. These opinions are scattered here and there in the Samhitás and in the Upanishads, in the former as appendices and in the latter as citations to be criticised. This intermediate period between the Hymns and the Upanishads was a very fertile one. Its chief defect was lack of systematic comparison and examination of

individual doctrines. Owing to this the systematic philosophy of the Upanishads has altogether superseded the literature of this period and except stray citations we have nothing extant of it.

These stray philosophical speculations had shattered the foundations of the Hymnal Theology but the latter had not altogether given up its hold on the popular mind when the Upanishads appeared. It was for the first time in the Upanishads themselves that the Mythical, semi-animistic views of the origin and end of the Universe were finally discarded and the cosmological problem was re-stated in a metaphysical form. A temporal and spatial *arche* of the world was no longer the object of philosophical investigation. Time and space, eternity and infinity themselves were thought to be insufficient to explain the Universe and a definite conception of the *Brahman* or the Self-conscious Spirit was reached. This new conception at once satisfied the logical, metaphysical and ethical needs of the people as we shall see anon.

The Upanishadic doctrine could not be universally recognised at once. Perhaps there were other philosophical schools contemporary with the Upanishads but based on pre-Upanishadic thoughts. The existence of these schools is a new hypothesis. It is made probable by such references as "तत्रैकं ब्राह्मणसद्वेदनं चासीत्" &c. These lost philosophical schools almost contemporary with the Upanishads but heterodox in nature are most probably the original sources of Buddhism, Jainism and the ancient philosophical Sūtras of India. The two

Mimánsás (Karma-Mimánsá and Brahma-Mimánsá) are the only systems directly based on the orthodox literature. The other systems must have had their origin in the heterodox literature now lost to us, and must have been struggling for existence for a while with the Upanishadic doctrine.

The systematised philosophy of the Upanishads had two dangers to face. In the first instance, it had to struggle for existence with its contemporaries, the ancestors of the future great systems, and, then, it had to fear its own commentators who collided with one another when interpreting important Upanishadic texts. Jaimini, Audulomi, Kārshnājini, Kāśakritsna, Bādari, Āśmarathya, Ātreya and a host of other sages appear to have explained the Upanishadic texts in a thousand different ways. But at last Bādarāyana appeared on the field. He tried to reconcile the apparent contradictions in the Upanishads and shewed sometimes rightly and sometimes wrongly that every important Upanishadic text referred to the *Brahman*. He also collected the conflicting opinions of his different predecessors on controversial points and with his extra-ordinary logical acumen tried to refute every system of thought that prevailed in his time and differed from his own. He severely handled Buddhism and Jainism, shattered the very foundations of Sāṅkhya and Vaiseshika, dismissed Yoga and Nyāya as unworthy of his attention and crushed the Jaiminīyas and the Pāncharātras under his heavy feet.

The grávest defect of the great Bādarāyana was

that he did not clearly distinguish the historical, the mythological and the positive portions of the Upanishads and this lamentable confusion led to his squeezing every Upanishadic text into the self-same Brahmic mould. But, in spite of this defect, he succeeded in achieving his grand task. His brief Sūtras, later in time than most of the existing philosophical Sūtras, fully elucidated the Vedāntic Epistemology and, refuting the logic of the other systems, established the Upanishadic doctrine on a firm ground.

With the enunciation of the great Upanishadic formulæ or *Mahāvākyas*, the animistic Polytheism of the Hymnal period of the Vedic *eon* had disappeared from the cultured Indian mind and the idea of One Supreme Being was firmly grasped by it. Unity of nature, perhaps vaguely present to the pre-historic human instinct, had been early lost with the advance of the logical capacity of man. Through the influence of the Upanishadic teachings this Unity of nature, including both the subjective and the objective worlds, was not only recovered by man but has been transformed from its instinctive, uncritical, hylozoistic form into the critical, rational perfection in which we possess it to-day.

CHAPTER II.

THE SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA.

By the Systematic Philosophies of India we mean here the so-called six systems which arose side by side with Buddhism, Jainism and the cult of the Pancharātras just after the appearance of the Upanishadic literature. The Vedic period of the Sanskrit literature had ended with the Upanishads. The Sūtra period that followed the Upanishads and, perhaps, began with the Kalpasūtras and ended with Bālarāyana differed both in matter and form from the preceding literature. The authors of this period appear to have been specialists. A division of labour appeared to be necessary to them and each selected a special field for himself. The orthodox systems were either theistic or non-theistic, while the heterodox ones were decidedly atheistic. The Yoga with its offshoot, the Pancharātra cult, is the only philosophical system of India which accepted God (a personal lord of the world) from the very beginning. The other systems had originally no concern with God as a personal Being. The Sāṅkhya has always remained non-theistic. The Mīmāṃsakas did not accept either God or the creation and destruction of the world. The Vedāntic *Brahman* is another name for reality and has nothing to do with a personal God in the original non-dualistic form of the doctrine. The original authors of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika

sûtras too had, perhaps, nothing to do with God, and Udayana appears to be the first Indian logician who tries to demonstrate the existence of God. The heterodox doctrines, Buddhism, Jainism (and the minor ones like the Chârvâka system) were decidedly atheistic.

The Sâṅkhya is perhaps the oldest of the systematic philosophies. It is at least as old as the sources of Buddhism, if not even older. The Buddhistic Nihilism and the Sâṅkhya Dualism were the greatest rivals of the Upanishadic Non-dualism. The name Sâṅkhya was due to the analytical nature of the system. Sâṅkhya, Asadvâda and Yoga are the only philosophical doctrines that are referred to in the genuine Upanishads. Details of these doctrines in the pre-Upanishadic or Upanishadic ages cannot be ascertained at this date. Only this much can be said that the Upanishadic doctrine formed an advance on the Sâṅkhya and the Yoga, and at the same time it was a reply to the Asadvâda. These four doctrines (Asadvâda, Sâṅkhya, Yoga and the Upanishadic teaching) formed the original sources of the four systems founded by the Mâdhyaṁikas, the Kâpilas, the Pâtanjalas and the Vedântins. Gautama most probably borrowed his theory of the Prâmanas from the Sâṅkhya, and Kanâda developed the theory of the elements already suggested by the Upanishads. Jaimini saw the necessity of constructing a theory of the religious rites declining through the influence of the Upanishads. The real chronological order of the Indian philosophical systems would, therefore, be as follows. 1. Sâṅkhya (and Buddhism)

2. Yoga, 3. Vedānta, 4. Nyāya and Vaiseshika and 5. Mīmāṃsā. But the existing Sūtras of these systems appear in a somewhat different order. The Yoga-sūtras are the earliest. Then follow the Vaiseshika, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. The Vedānta-sūtras come later than all these which along with Buddhism, Jainism, etc., are refuted by them. The Sāṅkhya-sūtras in their existing form are decidedly later than all these. In reality they are a spurious composition of the 15th century at the earliest and were unknown not only to Śāṅkara and Vāchaspati but also to Mādhava, the author of the Sarvadarsana Sangraha. It is not clear, therefore, what Sāṅkhya work Bādarāyaṇa had in his mind when he refuted that doctrine.

Soon after the Nirvāṇa of Gautama, the Buddha, the chief Indian philosophical systems were crystallised into Sūtras. The Sāṅkhya system was really taught by Kapila to Āsuri. Āsuri taught it to Panchasikha who is most probably the author of the original Sāṅkhya-sūtras. The work of Panchasikha named Shashtitantra has been admirably abridged by Īśvara Krishna in his 70 *āryās*. The work of Panchasikha had been lost before Śāṅkara whose authority on the Sāṅkhya is Īśvara Krishna. Fragments of the Shashtitantra might have been known to Vāchaspati who quotes it now and then. Īśvara Krishna as annotated by Vāchaspati is the ultimate authority on the Sāṅkhya, and in spite of the vain efforts of Vijñānabhikṣu to amalgamate it with the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya system is to-day what it was in the days of Vāchaspati.

Patanjali's Yoga-sûtras were annotated by Vyāsa and the Gitā tried to reconcile the Sāṅkhya and Yoga. Since the times of the Gitā there have been no original contributions to the two systems. The Vaiseshika-sûtras were enlarged by Praśastapāda. The Nyāya-sûtras were annotated by Pakshila, criticised severely by Dingnāga and defended by Uddyotakara. The last author's Nyāya-vārtika has been elucidated by Vāchaspati who has been again explained and criticised by Udayana. After Udayana Gangeśa amalgamated the Nyāya and Vaiseshika in his Nyāya-chintāmani and, since then, the history of both these philosophies has been identical. The Mimāṃsa-sûtras were annotated by Śabara and supplemented by Kumārila. The Vedānta-sûtras were originally explained in two different ways by Upavarsha and Baudhāyana. Upavarsha was followed by Śankara and Baudhāyana by Rāmānuja-Śankara and Rāmānuja are the well-known expounders, of the two great explanations of the Vedāntic theory. Śankara represents the theory as pure Non-dualism, while Rāmānuja makes it qualified Non-dualism. After Śankara and his great critic Rāmānuja, no original work was written on Vedāntism. These authors have had numerous commentators whose mere mention would fill a volume. It was only after the phenomenal appearance of Gangeśa's text on Logic (Nyāya-chintāmani), welding once for all the teachings of Gautama and Kanāda that a new necessity presented itself to the representatives of the other philosophical systems. A fresh struggle for existence

began in the world of Indian thought. Gangeśa's logic and his terminology and their universal acceptance necessitated a remodelling of all the philosophical text-books and the task has been creditably accomplished by Chitsukha and Madhusūdana for Vedāntism.

The above is a very succinct account of the systematisation of the Indian Philosophical Schools. Now we have to see the inter-relation of the main positions of these schools of thought. We shall presently see that the Upanishadic thought busied itself with the concrete reality and started with the very foundations of knowledge. In time its followers began to distinguish all that was based either in nature or in thought on the abstractions from this concrete reality as a delusion. Every phase of thought that differed from Vedāntism must be presumed, therefore, to have a place in this delusion. The Śākshin of the Upanishads in whom moments of knowledge arise just as waves arise in the ocean; who is neither subjective nor objective but whose manifestations these inseparable cor-relates, the subjective and the objective continua, are; and who witnesses in himself the appearance and disappearance of all that exists including what we term as our corporeal existence; this Śākshin, the most real being, or rather the only real being, was altogether lost sight of by the other systems. It was split into two by the Sāṅkhyas who thought that there existed two classes of realities: one subjective, comprehending numberless Purushas and the other objective, constituting the single Prakriti. This dualism was the starting-point

of the delusion. When once the split was made, it was not easy to recover the original unity. The Purushas of the Sāṅkhyas appeared to be quite useless to some critics like the Chārvākas. These latter rejected the subject altogether and recognised the objective world as the sole reality and made the subject a mere property of the object. But the subject thus discarded often pressed itself upon thought and at last the scale was turned when Buddhism recognised the subjective principle alone and rejected the object altogether. When separated from each other neither the subject nor the object could keep its unity. Both were pulverised in turn. Unconnected moments of knowledge were the only realities acknowledged by the Buddhists. This is the climax of subjectivism which assumed in it the form of a psychic atomism. The objective atomism was brought into perfection by the followers of Kanāda. Thus alternately the subject and the object abstracted from the Sākshin and losing their original unity were naturally pulverised. But the reaction soon set in. It was expedited by sceptics like the Jainas. What is real? Is it the *prāmāṇa* or the *prameya*? The *prāmāṇa* is always finite and imperfect. It can never be omniscient. The *prameya* is, on the other hand, inert and impure to wherever we go. Where are then perfection and infinity, the natural objects of the human faith? This was the question asked by the Bhaktas, who at last being unable to recover the real, perfect and infinite entity, early lost by thinkers, fancied it to be extra-mundane. In this way the doctrine of the

Upanishads, being attacked on every side by the Dualism of the Sāṅkhyas, the psychic atomism of Buddhism, the physical atomism of the logicians and the theology of the Pancharātras, needed for its survival a systematic Epistemological investigation which was at last accomplished by Bādarāyana and explained fully by Śankara.

CHAPTER III.

THE VEDANTIC DOCTRINE BRIEFLY STATED.

Before examining the Vedāntic position in detail, it would be convenient to have before us a brief statement of the doctrine. Most philosophical systems in India and elsewhere have the world as perceived by the senses for their starting-point. Such systems precede in time those that are critical enough to be dissatisfied with this starting-point and try to replace it by something else. In Europe rejection of the sensuous world as the starting-point of philosophical thought is comparatively recent. It begins with Descartes and is systematically carried out by Kant. In India it began with the Upanishadic doctrine, was developed and carried to extremes by the Buddhistic thinkers and was almost perfected by Bādarāyana, Gaudapāda and their early successors about two thousand years before the appearance of the Cartesians.

Discarding the objective starting-point of the ordinary thought, the Bauddhas as well as the early Vedāntins adopted facts of knowledge embracing both the subject and the object as its two factors for their starting-point. But the essential unity of knowledge was never acknowledged by the Bauddhas, which is the most emphatic assertion of Vedāntism. Knowledge itself and not this or that known object is, of course, the starting-point of every critical thinker. But 'what is

unit of knowledge' is the first question of the Vedāntic Epistemology. If we adopt the momentary unit of knowledge accepted by Buddhism, we fall into gross absurdities. It is a philosophical common-place to say that everything known to us is inside our knowledge and we have to start, therefore, with knowledge and not with things known or fancied to be known and existing outside of knowledge. But the momentary units of knowledge are themselves inside pure knowledge, or we might say, in the Kantian terminology, that the Pure ego always embraces the Empirical ego. This pure ego or the Sākshin of the Vedāntic epistemology is fancied to be an abstraction by some critics. But this very criticism implies that the Sākshin is not a logical abstraction but the highest reality. Out of more than one psychic or external phenomenon one abstracts different factors. This power of abstraction cannot be in the mutually exclusive phenomena even if they are conceived to be self-conscious. One particular phenomenon of this description can at best resolve itself into parts.

Even this would involve a mysterious process and cannot be easily explained. But for a phenomenon to analyse itself into factors and then to identify one of these with other phenomena similarly self-analysed but totally exclusive of one another and absolutely unconnected with the identifying phenomenon is the grossest absurdity ever fancied by man. Such reasons led Vedāntism to reject the momentary self-complete Buddhistic unit of knowledge.

Knowledge is the Vedāntin's starting-point. The real nature of knowledge has to be examined by every sound critic before he declares anything positively. In this radical procedure of investigation the Vedāntin hates logical entities more than any other thinker. This is quite evident from his rejection† of the categories of Kanāda which are no doubt mere logical entities abstracted from the concrete reality. The Vedāntin is in search of concrete reality and knows full well that this reality can not be found by hypothesis in an abstraction. The momentary unit of knowledge accepted as the concrete reality by the psychic atomism of the Bauddhas is itself an abstraction or a mere element of the eternal, infinite, all-embracing, self-conscious spirit which finds itself in every momentary unit, connects these units, makes abstractions of them and, in short, constitutes them to be what they are. Without the Permanent Being the momentary units of Buddhism would have been so chaotic that the very appearance of that doctrine in the world would have been impossible.

This Permanent Being, the Sākshin of all experiences, is the concrete starting-point of Vedāntism. Just as waves rise out of and disappear into the ocean, so experiences of the moment rise and disappear in it. The Empirical ego or Jiva and the objective world are both mere phenomena of this noumenon. There is nothing external to this Being and in reality there can

† See Sankara on the Brahmasutras C. II. 2.

be no question of an inside and an outside of it, these terms being applicable only to the mutually exclusive phenomena. The false identification of this Being with the Body, which is itself an appearance or rather a congregate of appearances in it, is the root-cause of the notions of inside and outside, beginning and end, and myriads of other opposites. "This Being is all solid knowledge and has no outside and inside," says the Upanishad. To limit this Being to the body is a delusion. It is limitation of the unlimited or *Máyá* (measurement literally). The body appeared to this Being at a certain moment just as other things appear to it and will one day disappear like so many other things. To think that the body is the centre of the Universe and everything else depends upon it, is a delusion like the geocentric view of the siderial world. Men have been freed from this delusion by Kant in Europe and by the Upanishads in India.

It has been just said that the false limitation of the *Sákshin* to the body is *Máyá*. Really the *Sákshin* is God. While identifying itself with the body and fettered by this delusion, it is *Jiva* or the Individual soul. The difference between *Íśvara* and *Jíva* is only a difference of standpoint. Look at yourself from the individual, corporeal standpoint and you are a *Jiva*. Look at yourself from the Universal, spiritual standpoint and you are God. But which is the true standpoint, the individual or the universal? The very power found in ourselves of transcending the individual standpoint proves its delusory nature. It impiles that

we are conscious of a Higher Being than our individuality and we shall see that the Vedāntic Epistemology recognises no other consciousness but that of the self. Thus, we see that our true self is the Eternal, Divine one, and not the transitory and cosmic one as we take it ordinarily to be.

A delusion is, according to the Mediæval definition of it, mistaking one thing for quite another. We shall see that this definition is wrong. One thing cannot be taken for quite another thing. We shall show in the Chapter on Delusion that it is always either an addition or a subtraction of ideas, or, in short, it is either mistaking a part for the whole or *vice versa*. In the case of a mirage, for example, we perceive a part of water, i.e., its visual qualities. We are not warranted to affirm the concomitance of the tactual and gustatory qualities along with the visual qualities perceived in this case. Still we assert the existence, in the desert sunshine, of the whole water (composed of the visual and many other qualities). In the same way, we mistake our corporeal self which is a group of phenomena rising in our real Divine self for our whole being and, as long as we do it, we are deluded. The objective world is a series of waves in the Unitary Divine ocean of knowledge. The identification of this whole knowledge with either the world or with the body, which is a part of it, is a delusion in as much as it is mistaking a part or a group of parts for the whole. It is not an illusion appearing in the vacuum or in something that is quite different from it as

Śankara fancies. It is owing to this that we have rejected the illusion theory of *Māyā* and have propounded the new **Delimitation Theory**.

True knowledge would be, according to the above theory, a knowledge of the world from a higher standpoint and not a knowledge of something quite different from it as Śankara appears to think. You are living in a gross delusion as long as you fancy that **this** body is identical with your complete self or, at least, is its only real possession and that every thing else has a value for yourself in proportion to its serviceability to the body. You are really free as soon as you transcend the physical standpoint and, reaching the spiritual one, are convinced, and model your physical, intellectual and ethical life according to the conviction that the spirit or your real self is the Universal, Divine consciousness to whom this body is as much an appearance as anything else in the world and whose interest, accordingly, would be the welfare and harmonious progress of the whole world and not only of a part of it. This conviction, if altogether realised, would mean the real and only possible Mukti or absolute salvation of the Soul.


According to this view, Vedāntism is no longer a system of thought, inimical to sound ethics as many have fancied. Śankara in his ascetic frenzy often tended to subjective idealism and trampled upon ethics which has led to his being stigmatised as a Crypto-Bauddha. But when he did so, he really overshot his mark and contradicted himself. The real Vedāntic

theory is neither subjective idealism nor materialism, but transcends both and reconciles them. Instead of being inimical to Ethics, it maintains it against anti-moral and non-moral theories and supplies the most valid ground for its existence. "Be *sarvabhūtātma-bhūtātman* and try to do good to the whole world, of course, including your own body." "Do not think of sacrificing everything else for your body." The chief Ethical formula would be expressed in one of the above forms. But why should I do good to the world? Let me "eat, drink and be merry". This is the reply of the Epicure to the Ethical preacher. If you hold out the rewards and punishments of the next world to the anti-moralist, he ridicules your credulity and boldly asserts that there is no future life. If you try to show him that reward for virtue and punishment for sin come to us even in this life, he laughs at your "innocence and cowardice" and tells you to be clever enough to avoid the pain and punishment mixed with the sensuous enjoyments and cull out wisely only the pleasurable elements out of these. The most convincing answer to the Epicurean has been given by Vedāntism and similar systems of thought. Your real being is identical with the world's being theoretically as well as practically and your body is just a thing among other things in the world. Neither sacrifice the world for your body nor your body for the world. Behave altogether in such a way that the whole world (and your body as well) may attain to harmonious perfection. This is the only way to

happiness. Have, in short, a totalistic and not a partialistic view of the world and, then, there is no conflict between your interest and the interest of the world.

The whole Vedāntic doctrine can be summed up in the following five great formulæ. Ontologically, nothing can come out of nothing—“कथं महतः सञ्जायते”

Seek the real, therefore, which is one beforeless and afterless, inless and outless—“तदेतद्ब्रह्मा पूर्वं स न परम न त्वरम वा ह्यम्” Epistemologically, this real entity is knowledge infinite — “सर्वज्ञानमनन्तम्”. And, ethically, all peace and happiness is in this infinite—“यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नास्ति सुखमस्ति”. This reality is not to be sought outside thyself and thou art not different from it. Thou art that—“तत्त्वमसि”.



CHAPTER IV.

REFUTATION OF OTHER DOCTRINES.

We have already seen that Vedāntism is a doctrine of the Sākshin. It is not transcendentalism. It is a philosophy of immanency but not in the Spinozistic sense. The world is in the Sākshin but not *vice versa*. The Gita says “न त्वं तेषु ते मयि.” The Sākshin is evidently much more than the world, just as the substance or the cause of any effect, though identical with it, is still much more. Gold is identical with an ornament made of it. Still it is much more than that. All gold ornaments are gold and nothing else, but all gold is not a particular ornament. Everything is identical with the Divine reality. But that reality is not altogether identical with any one thing or even with the series of these things unless the series is carried to infinity. Śvetaketu is asked by his father whether he had made an enquiry about that which being learnt nothing remains unlearnt, which being thought nothing remains unthought and which being known nothing remains unknown. On this Śvetaketu wishes to know what like that entity was which once known, nothing remains unknown. His father informs him that just as nothing of clay remains unknown when a lump of clay is known, so that entity, of which he had spoken, once known nothing remains unknown. By this entity Śvetaketu's father meant the Sākshin and, with a num-

ber of illustrations, shows that this Sákshin is the *real self* of man. This being the case, every system of thought that tries to make an apotheosis of any abstraction from the concrete Sákshin must necessarily be condemned by Vedántism.

The Sánkhyas divide the Sákshin into a subject and an object and, then, further divide the subject into an infinite number of Purushas. Both the subjective spirits and the objective Prakriti are separately real. Their relation is false and arises out of Aviveka or want of distinction. Prakriti is practically self-moved and the mere presence of Purusha is needed for the evolution of the *Mahat* and other principles out of it. All that is gross has come out of its finer cause. The finest causal state of matter out of which this perceptible world has evolved is termed Prakriti by the Sánkhyas. This Prakriti has three elements in it, viz., pure *ens*, energy and inertia. When these three elements are in equilibrium, there is no cosmos. But we have a cosmos when this equilibrium is disturbed owing to the presence of the Purusha, just as a needle is put into motion by the presence of a magnet. Prakriti and Purusha (or rather Purushas) are both real and distinct beings. Confounding them with one another is *Aviveka*. Just as in a red-hot ball of iron we confound two things, fire and iron, and then speak of the red-round fire and the hot iron, attributing the redness and roundness of the iron to the fire and the heat of the fire to the iron, so we confound in the world the two distinct beings, Prakriti and Purusha, attributing Puru-

sha's knowledge to matter and the material forms and changes to the spirit. The Sāṅkhya conception of the dualistic nature of the Universe was accepted by the followers of Patanjali. But the unity of purpose so apparent in the world could not be accounted for by this dualism and this led them to form a new conception—that of a Purusha who is perfect and not miserable (though it be only through *Aviveka*) like the Purushas of the Sāṅkhyas. This new conception served both as an Ethical ideal and an intelligent ruler of the Universe.

Against the followers of Kapila and Patanjali the Vedāntic teachers urge the following objections, viz., untenability of the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious elements in the world; the absurdity of fancying a state when the Universe was or will be in the Prakriti form; ignoring by these systems of the self-evident fact of the continuous idealisation of nature; and superfluity of the Purusha conception, 'the Sāṅkhya Prakriti being self-sufficient. If we start from our own perception, we can distinguish between the conscious and the unconscious. That which shows signs of consciousness, or in other words, behaves like our own body is thought to be conscious and that which behaves otherwise is thought to be unconscious. But if we go deeper, we see that consciousness is the result of a contact between our senses and an object, and this being the case, the object is as much a cause of the consciousness as the senses. Where is this consciousness—in the perceived

object or in the percipient ? That cannot be decided. Besides, the three *Gunās* that are thought to be the constituents of Prakriti are themselves rather mental than material and the difference between matter and mind (or between Prakriti and Purusha) is annihilated by the Sāṅkhyas themselves. Then they accept that the equilibrium of the three *Gunās* is *Pralaya* and when this is disturbed the world evolves out of it. But what disturbs the equilibrium and for what does this disturbance occur ? If you fancy that the presence of the Purusha effects this disturbance, then this presence being eternal, there ought to be no *pralaya*. As for the motive that leads to the disturbance, it cannot be in the perfect and free Purusha who wants nothing, nor can it be in the inert Prakriti. Moreover what could this motive be ? It can be neither enjoyment nor salvation, for the dead Prakriti can have none of these and Purusha is already free and indifferent to all enjoyment. Again the Sāṅkhyas can not account for the continuous idealisation of nature. Why should the *udāsīna* or indifferent Purusha be always trying to bring nature into perfect harmony with his idea ? Lastly, Prakriti containing in itself *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (or the elements of consciousness, action and materiality), what is the need of a Purusha ? The reply that all combinations are for some one and, hence, nature being a definite combination implies the existence of Purusha is self-contradictory ; for, if that be so, Purushas cannot be fancied to be indifferent. The Sāṅkhya Purushas being super-

fluous, the God of Patanjali untouched by misery, action, etc., falls to be still more useless.

Thus, discarding Sāṅkhya and Yoga, we come to the theory of the Tārkikas. They have a set of clean-cut categories quite distinct from one another and fancy that the world is, through *adrishta* (or virtue and sin), reduced to a state of indivisible, final atoms and through the same *adrishta*, these atoms again combine and build the world. Kanāda, the Empedocles of India, propounded this atomic theory. It was acceptable to his brother philosopher, Gautama, too. The followers of these thinkers supplemented the theory with the conception of an architect who fashions the world out of the atoms, but the originators of the theory appear to have thought *adrishta* and atoms sufficient to explain the world and did not require an architect to build it. Śāṅkara thinks that the categories (substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and Inherence, are not mutually exclusive and independent realities as the Vaiśeṣhikas fancy. What is substance apart from all its qualities? Actions are mere qualities. The other three categories are evidently mere logical entities. Really the same thing is a substance from one standpoint and a quality or action from another. As for the atoms, the very conception is absurd. The world is continuous and *ākāśa* (or space) is as much material as anything else. Distinct atoms floating in immaterial space are creations of the logician's mind. Besides, why should any atom be final? Being related to

space on all sides the ultimate atom must have dimensions and is divisible accordingly. Go to any length, you cannot reach the limits of divisibility. Moreover, the supposition that the world is once reduced to the atomic state and has *pralaya* and again comes out of these atoms, is beset with the same difficulties as the Sāṅkhya conception of *Srishti* and *pralaya* ? What is the cause of *Srishti* and *Pralaya* ? Is it *adrishta* ? If so whose *adrishta* ? The dead atom can have no virtue or sin, while the soul, without a body or mind during *Pralaya*, could have none. The logical idea of God as the architect of the world will be criticised in the Chapter on the Existence of God.

Next, we have the Karmamimāṃsakas. They do not accept either a beginning or an end of the world and, throwing knowledge into the background, hold out action as the chief end of man. All science, whether human or divine, is to be construed with reference to action. Knowledge is subordinate to action. This tenet conflicts with Vedāntism which maintains that knowledge is the end of man and all else is subordinate to it. The long controversy between the Vedāntin and the Mīmāṃsaka on this point is mostly due to a misunderstanding of the meaning of action. The Mīmāṃsaka thinks that the soul is active and ought to be so in a particular way for its welfare, while the Vedāntin thinks that it cannot be active in the Mīmāṃsaka sense and, therefore, oughtness has no meaning for it. 'What is' has more interest for the Vedāntin than 'what ought to be.' 'What is' is true. 'What

ought to be' is a mere fancy. 'What is' cannot be changed. It is permanent. 'What ought to be' depends upon your will. A fact is before you and you must perceive it. You cannot ignore it. But when a ritual is to be performed by you, you may or may not perform it. Now the Mīmāṃsaka's 'oughts' are of the nature of a ritual. They can be violated. But the Vedāntin's reality is an objective force which presses itself upon you and you are not free to ignore it. There lies the great strength of the Vedāntin. Whatever the origin of the knowledge of the Vedāntic reality, its final demonstration lies in its own truth. Whoever tells you that there is a tree in front, the final demonstration lies in the tree itself. You look in front and see that there is a tree. So the Upanishads make the *Brahman* known to you, but your own thought tells you that they are right and have shown you the truth. The Mīmāṃsaka's theory fails to appeal to your reason. Its teachings have no force, if you have no faith in them. Faith lends all the force possessed by the Mīmāṃsaka's duties, while faith itself is created and enforced by the knowledge of the Vedāntic Reality. Action is a property of matter. The soul knows action as well as everything else. Hence action is foreign to the soul and cannot be its end. Knowledge or *Chit* is the essence of the soul. As for the result of knowledge we do not agree with the Mīmāṃsaka in saying that mere knowledge, not directly leading to action, is fruitless. To one who is trembling through fear at the sight of a coiling thing in darkness, mere knowledge

that the cause of this fear is nothing but a cord is useful and removes all his fear, though, instead of leading to action, it rather stops the tremor and other abnormal actions of his body. In the same way, knowledge of the Sākshin as the only reality as described in these pages, though not directly leading to any action, secures mental peace and, removing all that is abnormal, confers *Abhaya* or safety on us and leads us out of *Soka*—"अभयं वै जनकं प्राप्नोऽसि"—"तस्मिन् शोकमात्मवित्".

The Pancharātrīc theology will be criticised in the Chapter on God and is, therefore, omitted here. The Buddhistic Epistemology has already been exposed and need not be touched here.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE PRAMANAS (THE ORDINARY VIEW).

The word *pramāna* has two meanings. A *pramāna* is either an original source of knowledge or a demonstration of what is already known from another source. This ambiguity has led to many confusions in the Indian Philosophy, as we shall see presently, and to avoid such confusions, we have stated these meanings here at the outset. Pramānas are, according to the loosest enumeration, eight in number. They are 1. Pratyaksha or perception, 2. Anumāna or inference, 3. Upamāna or assimilation, 4. Śabda or verbal authority, 5. Arthāpatti or implication, 6. Asambhava or impossibility, 7. Anupalabdhi or lack of being perceived and 8. Aitihya or human tradition. Íśvara-krishna rejects five of these *pramānas* and accepts only Pratyaksha, Anumāna and Śabda. 2. 394

Ordinarily, Pratyaksha is explained as sensuous perception. Anumāna is inference, particularly the syllogistic inference. Upamāna is knowledge through similarity. A man is told by some one that Gavaya is a wild creature similar in form to the domestic cow. He goes to the forest and, perceiving such a creature, at once identifies it as a Gavaya. Śabda is verbal authority, more particularly that of the Śruti or the revealed texts. Arthāpatti is implication. A man is stout but is said to eat nothing during the day. This

fact implies or gives by Arthāpatti that he eats during the night. Asambhava is impossibility. A man says that he has seen a horse with horns and no one can accept his words for what he says is impossible. Here impossibility is the authority for rejecting the man's words. Anupalabdhi is not perceiving a thing at a particular place and during a definite time. A man says that there is no pitcher in the room he occupies and his authority for the assertion is his not perceiving it in the room at the time of the assertion. Aitihya means human tradition as distinguished from divine revelation.

Pratyaksha, Anumāna and Śabda are accepted a *pramānas* by most Indian thinkers. Upamāna is rejected as it is thought to be a combination of verbal authority and memory. Arthāpatti is a kind of syllogistic inference and so it is not accepted as a separate *pramāna*. Asambhava and Anupalabdhi too can be included in syllogistic inference. Aitihya is nothing but verbal authority which includes oral and written, human and divine, words. Pratyaksha alone is accepted as a valid *pramāna* by the Chārvākas. Pratyaksha and Anumāna are accepted by the Bauddhas and the Vaiśeshikas. Pratyaksha, Anumāna and Śabda are accepted by the Sāṅkhyas and others. The other *pramānas* are quite unimportant and are here and there mentioned by the Mīmāṃsakas and Rhetoricians.

The interconnection of the *pramānas* and their place in human knowledge have been thus described by the Tārkikas or Mediæval logicians of India. Know-

ledge is of two kinds. It is either presentation or representation (Anubhava or Smṛiti). Recognition or *pratyabhijñā*, which is a combination of both and is accepted as a very important form of knowledge by the Vedāntins, is neglected by the Tārkikas in their Epistemological scheme. Anubhava or presentation is again of two kinds. It is either valid or otherwise. When valid, it is termed Yathārtha. If not valid, it is called Ayathārtha. Taking a thing to be what it is, is Yathārtha Anubhava and taking a thing to be what it is not, is Ayathārtha Anubhava. Yathārtha Anubhava or valid presentation is of four kinds. It is either Pratyaksha, or Anumāna, or Upamāna, or Śabda. Pratyaksha is of six kinds. Chākshusha or Ocular, Śrāvana or Auricular, Ghrāṇaja or Olfactory, Tvācha or Tactual, Rāsana or Gustatory, and Mānasa or Mental. We have a *pratyaksha* when some object comes into relation with one of the six senses. This relation may be either Samyoga, Samyukta Samavāya, Samyukta Samaveta 'Samāvāya, Samavāya, Samaveta Samavāya or Viśeshana. We perceive a pitcher, its qualities (redness, etc.,) and also the kind of redness and other qualities. The pitcher and the particular perceiving sense, the eye or the skin, have Samyoga or contact between themselves. The pitcher's qualities inhere in it and so the relation between them and the perceiving sense is Samyukta Samavāya or inherence in the thing that has come into contact with the sense. The relation between the kind (Jāti) of the pitcher's quality and the perceiving sense is Samyukta Samaveta Samavāya or in-

herence in what inheres in the thing coming into contact with the sense, for *Jāti* inheres in the thing coming into contact with the sense, since *Jāti* inheres in redness and anything else possessed of it. But when we perceive a sound by the ear, the relation between the sense and the object is *samavāya* or inherence, for, in this particular case, the sense is identical with the sky limited in the earhole, and sound inheres in the sky according to Kanāda. The kind and qualities of sound are perceived through the relation called *Samaveta Samavāya* or inherence in the inhering, as they inhere in the sound which inheres in the earhole. The sixth relation or *Viśeshana* means qualification and exists between *abhāva* or non-existence (of anything) and the perceiving sense, for, in the case of a perception of *abhāva* (say of a pitcher), the locality qualified by the *abhāva* comes into contact with the sense, *e.g.*, the case of our perceiving a room qualified by the non-existence of a pitcher.

Anumāna or syllogistic inference is the second great *pramāna*. Other forms of inference are either taken into consideration by the Indian Logic or are thought to be valid only, if they can be expressed in a syllogistic form. When perceiving something which is a sure mark of something else (as smoke is of fire), we assert the existence of the unperceived marked thing, we are said to have an *Anumāna*. Knowledge of *Vyāpti* or the certain existence of the marked thing wherever the mark is, and perception of the mark in a *paksha* or the thing, where the marked object is conjec-

tured to be, are the two necessary conditions of an Anumāna. When an Anumāna made by a person for himself is expressed in words to others its verbal expression is technically termed a Nyāya and has five parts :—1. Pratijnā (the proposition, *e.g.*, the hill has fire), 2. Hetu (the reason, *e.g.*, because of the smoke), 3. Udāharana (an example, *e.g.*, wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen), 4. Upanaya (application, *e.g.*, the hill has smoke) and 5. Nigamana (the conclusion, *e.g.*, so the hill too has fire). Thus, when a man perceives smoke over a hill, he conjectures the existence of fire on it, and, sometimes, keeps the conclusion to himself and is, then, said to have a Svārthānumāna. But when he expresses his conjecture in words, the whole expression, whatever it be, can be, on full analysis, cast into the form of a Nyāya or syllogism. "The hill has fire, because it has smoke. Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen. The hill has smoke, and hence it has fire". This is the logical form into which we cast the expression of the particular inference (of fire from smoke indicated above). A knowledge of Vyāpti is necessary for making an *anumāna*, as we have seen, and there is a very lengthy and tiresome discussion on the question of Vyāpti. Vyāpti means an unconditional relation or a relation without an Upādhi or condition. This Vyāpti is sometimes reversible and sometimes not. This is the most important practical point about Vyāpti, and missing it leads to fallacies. Smoke and fire have a Vyāpti, for smoke is unconditionally related to fire.

There can be no smoke without fire. But, in this case, the Vyápti is irreversible and one-sided only. Smoke implies fire but fire does not always imply smoke, for you can have a smokeless fire. Fire must have smoke only, if it has wet fuel and so this reversed relation is no Vyápti for it has a condition, *viz.*, the presence of wet fuel. Hence, we can infer the existence of fire from that of smoke but not *vice versa*. Thus, the hill has fire for it has smoke, is a valid *anumāna*, but the inference that the hill has smoke for it has fire, is quite fallacious. Upádhi is defined as something not covering all cases of the mark but exactly co-extensive with the marked. In the case of the fallacious inference that the hill has smoke for it has fire, we have contact with wet fuel as the Upádhi that leads to the fallacy, for wet fuel does not cover all cases of the mark (fire), there being fires with dry fuel, but it is exactly co-extensive with the marked (smoke), there being no smoke without wet fuel and no wet fuel (in fire) without smoke.

Śabda is the third and last of the *pramānas* widely accepted in Indian Philosophy. Śabda means a word and Śabda means knowledge arising from a word. It is evident and is also definitely stated by logicians that only a trustworthy word is authoritative. But there is a great controversy as to what constitutes the trustworthiness of a word. If the speaker is generally fit to be trusted, his words are thought to be trustworthy. In the speaker, of course, correct knowledge and truthfulness implying want of sinister motives, are the features that go to make him trustworthy.

Thus, we see that *pratyaksha*, *anumāna* and *Śabda* are the *pramānas* ordinarily accepted by the Indians. Recent writers on Vedāntism who are rather eclectics than pure Vedāntins have accepted these and also some other *pramānas* in an uncritical way. But the early writers never admitted any of these *pramānas* into their epistemology, as we shall presently see. Anubhava or experience in a critical sense is the final authority for Vedāntism (e.g., Śankara's statement (अनुभववसानलाह्नविद्यायाः). *Śabda* (or the Upanishadic word) is apparently another great authority according to Bādarāyana and his early commentators. But what sort of authority it has for a real Vedāntin will be examined in the next lecture.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE PRAMANAS (THE CRITICAL VIEW).

The first objection against the ordinary view of the Pramānas is, as already hinted, that the term stands for both a source of knowledge and a demonstrative evidence. Apparently this ambiguity seems to be harmless. But it has led to one of the most serious controversies in the Indian Philosophy. I mean the controversy between those who hold that the Vedic word is an independent authority and those who maintain the opposite view that its authority is grounded on experience and inference. The same ambiguity is to a great extent responsible for the variable number of the Pramānas accepted by different thinkers. Those who accept *pratyaksha* as the only Pramāna do not altogether deny the existence or importance of Inference. But they do not think inference to be a source of new knowledge. They only deny Anumāna and Śabda the character of an ultimate source of knowledge.

On a brief examination of the Pramānas it appears that *pratyaksha* or perception is both a source of knowledge and a demonstrative evidence. A child that has never touched fire touches it and comes to know for the first time what burning a limb is. In

this case, touching fire is a source of knowledge. But when an adult perceives something shining on the ground and, not definitely knowing what it is, touches it and is convinced that it is a spark of fire, he has in this touch a demonstrative evidence that confirms his first vague conjecture. Pratyaksha in its character of a source of knowledge, chronologically and logically, precedes inference and verbal authority, and is, thus, superior to these two. It is, therefore, called the *Jyeshtha* or the eldest of the Pramānas. In its character of a demonstrative evidence, too, it is superior to the other Pramānas, for it is the ultimate demonstration of each of these, as we shall presently see. Anumāna is never a source of new knowledge. It is always demonstrative in its character. Śabda is always a source of knowledge. It can never be a demonstrative evidence in the proper sense of the expression. As a source of knowledge, of course, the Vedic word like other words is independent. As soon as you understand the meaning of a sentence, you have some knowledge. But whether the sentence expresses a real relation or only a fancied one could be decided only by inference or experience, in the case of the Vedic word as well as in that of the ordinary word. This distinction being clearly understood, the controversy between the Mīmāṃsakas who maintain the independent authority of the Vedas and those who hold the opposite view, appears to be quite futile. Verbal authority, whether Vedic or non-Vedic, is independent as a source of knowledge. But its ultimate

demonstration must be sought either in experience or in valid inference from experimental data. A child is told by his father that the rains, set in in India in a certain month. The child, no doubt, acquires a new knowledge from these words, if it does not already know the fact. But whether this knowledge is *yathārtha* or *ayathārtha* (i.e., objectively true or false) depends upon the child's own future experience.

Then, there is another fact about the Pramānas not noticed ordinarily. They appear to be inter-dependent, if we examine them closely. Most men think that *pratyaksha* is independent of Anumāna and Śabda. But it is not so. We see one part of a thing and infer unconsciously the existence of the rest and think and say that we see the whole thing. This is due, according to the Tārkikas, to the existence of the *avayavin*. But the *avayavin*, apart from the *avayavas* being a mere fancy, is rejected by the common thought as well as by Vedāntism, and, after preceiving a part, inferring the whole is nothing but inference. Similarly, our knowledge is helped by language. Thought and language go hand in hand. Thus we see that Pratyaksha, Anumāna and Śabda are inter-dependent. In fact, presentation and representation, intertwined closely and seldom occurring pure, are the ultimate sources of knowledge. Knowledge arising from Pratyaksha is as much a combination of these factors as that arising from Anumāna or from Śabda. In Pratyaksha presentation is emphatic, while in Anumāna representation is so. In knowledge arising from Śabda,

too, representation prevails. Words are presented to us and represent something in our thought. In reality Śabda (knowledge) would seem to be only a case of inference in as much as we infer in its case the objective validity of the speaker's assertion from his general trustworthiness. This is the view of the Vaiśeshikas. Let us, then, have only two ultimate Pramānas, presentation and representation or Anubhava and Smṛiti, all other *pramānas* being not sub-divisions of these, as the Tārikikas think, but rather complex facts of knowledge made up of these elements. But what is the difference between presentation and representation? Presentation is external and representation is internal. This would be the ordinary answer. But this is no difference at all. It makes representation a mental presentation (*mānasa anubhava*) and so we fall upon presentation or *anubhava* as the sole real *pramāna*.

The Vedāntin accepts *anubhava* as the ultimate authority for everything. He assumes, as self-evident, that this *anubhava* can examine itself. It can distinguish between the true and false elements in itself. Scholasticus wanted to know how to swim before entering into water, and, like him, some modern philosophers have tried to pause and examine knowledge before entering into it. This is not the procedure of the Vedāntic thought. It knows full well that *anubhava* is self-examining and we ought not to try to have an external examination of it before accepting it. Lack of this self-examination of Anubhava is the source of all contradictions. The ordinary thought has no rest. It re-

sorts to *pratyaksha* or sensuous perception and discovers that the senses show us only contradictory appearances. The senses of the same person differ among each other. The same thing, it is well known, is pleasant to one sense and quite otherwise to another. Again, different persons often perceive and think in different ways. Anthropological and Palæontological studies, researches in Comparative Psychology of animals, the observations of the child's mind, have brought to light evidences for a host of similar differences. But, on the other hand, if setting aside *pratyaksha*, we go to *anumāna*, we find that neither *vyāpti* nor absence of *upādhi* which is necessary for a knowledge of *Vyāpti* can be determined. *Vyāpti* being a Universal relation, true for the past, present and future, cannot be determined, as no one can ever witness all the cases, past, present and future, of any relation ; and *upādhi*, being defined as *Sādhānāvypaka* and *Sādhyasamavyāptika*, cannot be determined as it involves a knowledge of *vyāpti* which itself is indeterminate. Moreover knowledge of *vyāpti* requires that of *upādhi*, and knowledge of *upādhi* requires the knowledge of *Vyāpti* in the above definitions, and, thus, they are evidently defective, involving *anyonyāśraya* or mutual dependence. As for the third and last *pramāna*, *Sabda*, it is clear to every one that it is the weakest and most controversial of all the *pramānas*. *Śabda* or word is our authority and one naturally asks whose *Sabda* it is which is authoritative. Different religions accept different words as their authority, and even the words of the same spiritual text

are not free from untruth, contradiction, redundancy and other defects which render verbal authority invalid.

The Vedāntic Epistemology has supplied the most satisfactory replies to these and similar sceptical criticisms. The Tārkikas ground their *pramānas* in *pratyaksha*. But this *pratyaksha* is said to arise when a sense comes into contact with one object. Now, the question is as to how one knows that there is an object, and the answer given is that we know it through *pratyaksha*. But how does *pratyaksha* arise? Of course, when there is an object. Thus, we fall into a circle from which there is no escape. Besides, in defining *pratyaksha*, which is an ultimate source of knowledge according to the Tārkika, he dogmatically assumes the existence of a sense, of its object and of their contact, and, no wonder, if this slippery ground of sensuous perception leads to sceptical results. But the self-consciousness of Chiti which is the ultimate fact for Vedāntism does not imply any similar assumption, “सर्वोच्चात्मास्त्वित्येति” is the starting point of Śankara. Deny or doubt everything. But you cannot deny your own existence and Brahman or reality is nothing but yourself ‘आत्मा च ब्रह्म’. Denial of this reality is as impossible as overleaping one's own shadow or jumping over one's own shoulders. The most outspoken scepticism and the most emphatic atheism imply the existence of the doubter and the denier as clearly as the most credulous dogmatism. Thus, a *pratyaksha* higher than the sensuous one, i.e., self-knowledge (or consciousness of the *chiti* by itself), is reached as the

firm, ultimate footing by Vedántism. What self is it of which *chiti* is conscious? Is it the limited individual self? This question has already been answered in the lecture on the Vedántic doctrine and we need not be here detained by it. We saw there that the self of which *chiti* is conscious is the Universal one.

As for *anumāna*, two channels have been suggested by critics through which we can determine *vyāpti*. *Vyāpti* or universal relation can be determined either from causality or from identity. A tree is identical with a particular variety of it (say a mango tree) and, thus, we can always confidently assert that wherever there is a mango plant, there is a tree, or again, fire being the cause of smoke, we can always assert that smoke cannot occur without fire. But Vedántism upholding the identity-theory of causality (as we shall see in the lecture on the Causal relation), both these channels are reduced to one. Identity alone determines *Vyāpti* according to Vedántism. The time-honoured Tárkika's example of ratiocination that infers the existence of fire from that of smoke is really fallacious, as smoke collected into a jar can be held apart from fire. A real case of causality is found in the case of a pitcher of clay or an ornament of gold. The pitcher is identical with clay and the ornament with gold and the existence of the effect (pitcher or the ornament) implies the existence of the material of which it is made.

Thus, distinguishing the valid aspects of *pratyaksha* and *anumāna* we have now to consider the grounds

which give validity to Śabda, which is next to Anubhava (experience), the greatest authority for Vedāntism, and deemed even superior to it by some expounders of the doctrine. On an impartial examination of the real Vedāntic texts it appears that Śabda has no independent authority. All its authority is derived from *pratyaksha* and is ultimately, to be tested by the same. In short, Śabda-jñāna, being caused by *pratyaksha*, is only an expression of the latter, so much so that to Bādarāyana *pratyaksha* is synonymous with the word of Śruti. In his Sūtras, *pratyaksha* and *anumāna* are the words used for Śruti and Smṛiti. Both Śruti and Smṛiti are words. But all words are not direct expressions of *pratyaksha*. Śruti is superior to other words owing to its identity with *pratyaksha*, just as an honest eye-witness's words are superior to mere hearsay. In other words, originality or observation and accuracy of the expression thereof constitute the superiority of Śabda. The words of Śruti, expressing the original observations of the sages, are superior to other words in the same sense as the original observations and discoveries of a Newton or a Kelvin are to the commonplace second-rate essays of an ordinary student of Physics. Once discovered and expressed, the facts given in Śruti are amenable and intelligible to the ordinary reason like the discoveries of the great scientists, but to discover such facts anew without the help of the master-mind that saw it for the first time, though not impossible, is still a most difficult task. Besides, an untested new *pratyaksha* of an individual is

far inferior evidently to the mercilessly tested and widely accepted *pratyaksha* stereotyped in a scriptural text. This and this alone constitutes the superiority of scriptural words over the ordinary word for any religion, but few others have candidly acknowledged it like the Vedāntins.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CAUSAL RELATION.

The most popular view of the Causal Relation is that conceived by the Naiyáyikas in India. It is identical with the view of Mill in Europe. The unconditional and permanent antecedent of a phenomenon is said to be its cause by these Logicians. The cause, according to this view, must precede the effect and this antecedence must not be conditioned by something else. Clay is the cause of a pitcher, for the former always precedes the latter's appearance, and this antecedence is absolute and not conditioned. Day always precedes night and night always day. But their antecedence depends upon the relation between the Sun and the Earth and its variability. If the earth somehow stops its motion one half of it would have an everlasting day and the other a similar night. There is, therefore, no causal relation between day and night. Both are caused by the variable relation between the earth and the sun. So also the sky is not the cause of a pitcher though the former always precedes the latter, for even without the sky there can be the appearance of a pitcher (the Tárkika thinks).

This view of causality has been severely criticised both in India and in Europe. There are two points in this conception of causality, the antecedence and the unconditionality (or absolute necessity) of the cause.

The first, i.e., the antecedence of the cause, is quite untenable. The sun is the cause of light. But both are simultaneous. In fact, there is no hindrance to the appearance of an effect, if we get the cause just at the moment of the latter's production. Besides, the real cause of anything must endure as long as the effect. The existence of the cause before or after the effect is itself unnecessary and the definition of the Logicians excludes everything unnecessary from the causal relation. Thus it would appear that, not the antecedence of the cause, but its simultaneity with the effect is necessary for its being such. As for the second point, i.e., the absolute necessity of the cause. We have to ask the Naiyāyika what he means by the term necessity. The sky or space, he thinks, is quite unnecessary in the production of a pitcher. But to any man of common sense, space would appear to be one of the most necessary things in the production of anything in the world.

The fact is that this view of causality, which we term the logica view, does not take under consideration the real cause of anything. Logic, being a practical science, points out to men what they ought to secure in order to have the appearance of a desired effect. As soon as the cause ceases to exist, the effect must disappear. The most necessary thing is no cause according to this view, if it is provided by nature and requires no efforts in securing it. Space is ready everywhere and so the Logicians think that it is unnecessary in reproducing an effect. But, even, in this way we cannot defend the

logical definition of causality. If that which is ever ready and requires no human effort in securing it is no cause, God cannot be declared to be the cause of the world. But the Naiyāyikas consider God to be the Nimitta or external cause of the world. Not only this, even clay and other natural materials cannot be the causes of a pitcher or anything else, for they are provided by nature. What does a potter do when he makes a pitcher? He does not create clay or water. He makes a particular arrangement of the particles of matter provided already by nature. This particular arrangement, simultaneous with the pitcher, is its cause. All else is either not related to the pitcher or is, at best, related to it as the cause of this immediate cause of it. But, according to the Naiyāyikas, that which is a cause of the cause of an effect (e. g., the potter's father in the case of a pitcher) is no cause of the effect.

Thus, we see that the so-called logical theory of causality is full of contradictions. This theory implied that something is the cause of something else and the Buddhistic Epistemology thought this quite impossible. A thing is what it is. It cannot become something else. Besides, everything being momentary (according to Buddhism), the non-existence of the antecedent moment (or Śūnya) is the cause of the next moment. This view of causality is tantamount to a total denial of it. If consistently carried out, it would lead to Hume's flat refutation of the causal relation. One moment follows another. But there is no necessity that one should always follow the other. Causality is mere succession.

Both these views (the Naiyāyika and the Buddhistic) agree in this that they accept absolute difference between the cause and the effect. The effect is not in the cause, whether the latter is a reality or a non-entity. The effect is something quite new. These views are, therefore, said to be different aspects of the Asatkāryavāda (non-existence of the effect in the cause).

Against Asatkāryavāda the Sāṅkhyas and the Vedāntins propose Satkāryavāda (existence of the effect in the cause). The Asatkāryavāda asks "If the effect is already in the cause, why an effort to produce it?" Against this we have Śāṅkara's retort "if the effect is not already in the cause why an effort to produce it?" There is no oil in sand and no effort can produce it. Oil is already in a mustard seed and efforts are successful in securing it. Just as the shape of a statue is already contained in a piece of stone or metal but appears only when the portion of stone that covers it is removed, so the effect appears in its cause when the *āvarana* or obstruction is removed, though it is ever present in it. In fact, the cause always appears to us as one of its effects and as long as one effect appears, another effect cannot appear. Through the efforts of an agent or through the operations of nature, one effect disappears and another appears. All efforts are required to make the obstructions disappear. No effort can produce anything new out of something, or out of nothing. For every particular effect a peculiar arrangement of natural materials is necessary, and this arrangement plus the materials is the causal group that

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constitutes an effect. It is to be remembered in connection with this theory of causality that, according to it, cause and effect have the relation which is known as *tādātmya* in Indian Philosophy. *Tādātmya* means identity. The effect is essentially identical with the cause. But the effect is in the cause. The cause is not wholly contained in a particular effect as the *Gītā* points it out “न त्वहं तेषु ते मयि.”

This *tādātmya* theory of causality is allied to the Neo-Hegelian theory of causality and is one of the most important and original positions of Vedāntism.



CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE THREE STAGES OF THE COSMIC DELUSION

We have seen in the Chapter on the *Pramānas* how we fall into contradictions and absurdities, if we try to form an ontology according to the ordinary view of the world. This led us to believe that there is a radical defect in the ordinary conception of the world. This is explicitly or implicitly acknowledged by every systematic philosophy. Every philosophy tries to find out the real nature of this mistake. This task was long ago undertaken by Vedāntism in India.

The ordinary Logician, the sternest dogmatic in the philosophical world, in India as well as in Europe, very early accepted the mutually exclusive categories of Kanāda and Aristotle. Sensuous perception and the mode of linguistic expression as found in the human adult of the latest Geological period formed his starting point. For want of Anthropology and Comparative Psychology, the question, whether man has always felt as he feels to-day and whether all animals or even human infants feel like the human adult, never occurred to him. The ordinary sensuous perception posits the existence of matter (or something external) possessed of many qualities. Then the process of abstraction supplies some other entities like particularity, generality, relation, etc., and without critically examining the real nature of perception and

its implications the Logician enumerated his clean-cut categories which were to him like so many chambers in human thought. This dogmatic slumber of the logician was soon disturbed by a host of Materialists, Idealists and Sceptics, though the disturbance was only dilemmatic for a long time and no positive result was reached till Bádaráyana's followers in India and the Hegelians in Europe shewed the inter-connection of the categories.

Gautama and Jaimini are the representative dogmatists of India. The Bauddhas (particularly the Mádhyamikas and the Yogácháras) and the Vedántins represent Critical thought in this country. The other schools occupy an intermediate position and logically, though not always chronologically, form the transition from dogmatism to criticism. Gautama and Jaimini say that without an object there can be no *pratyaksha* and mentally add that this object is external to the percipient. This position gave way altogether under the crucial examination of perception by the Bauddhas. Take any facts of perception (or of knowledge in general) and let us see whether we are constrained to assume an object external to it. A fact or a moment of knowledge is real. It is the only certain thing. Even a denial of it is a fact of knowledge and so there is no escape from it. But beyond this moment we have no right to go. An external substance, a permanent being, and similar notions are mere fancies of the dogmatic logicians. There is no difference between knowledge and a known thing, for a

thing and its knowledge always go together
 “सद्योपलब्धनियमादनेदीनौलतद्विद्योः”

Two things exactly co-extensive cannot be shewn to be different from each other. Smoke and fire are two different things, for the *vyāpti* in this case is one-sided. Wherever there is smoke there is fire, but wherever there is fire there is no necessary existence of smoke. But when the *vyāpti* is reversible, the thing must differ only in name. They must be really one and the same thing. Rāma and the eldest son of Daśaratha are merely two names and they represent the same thing, as wherever the thing represented by the one name is, there is also that represented by the other. Similarly, a blue thing and a knowledge of it having a reversible *vyāpti* between them, there being no blue object without the idea and no idea without the object, the idea and the object are the same. Externality of the object is an unwarranted assumption and Jaimini's assertion that *pratyaksha* or perception arises only when there is *satsamprayoga* (or contact with an external reality) is, epistemologically, untenable. This acute Buddhistic criticism exposed the credulity of the followers of Gautama and Jaimini. But, as we have already seen, this criticism itself had apparently something wrong about it. It appeared at first that there was no going beyond its momentary unit and the notions of permanence, of causality, etc., so deeply rooted in the human mind could for a long time neither be given up nor maintained. But notwithstanding its apparent unsatisfactory character, the

Buddhistic criticism seemed to be unanswerable. Its vulnerable point lay too deep in its foundation to be visible to the ordinary intellect. But for Bádaráyana and his early followers, Dingnága's psychic atomism would have been reigning supreme in the Indian philosophical world in spite of the efforts of Uddyotakara and Kumáрила to annihilate it. The deep-rooted defects in the foundation of the Buddhistic logic could not escape the Röntgen rays of Bádaráyana's searching epistemological acumen. When these defects were once exposed by the great author of the Brahma-sútras, it was easy for the defenders of Pakshila and Śabara to pounce upon them.

It was Bádaráyana who for the first time rationally repudiated both the dogmatic Logicians and the Bauddhas, and established, as we have seen more than once, the permanent and non-dualistic character of the concrete reality. It is deplorable that the early commentaries on Bádaráyana are not available to-day. The commentaries still extant do not represent his teaching in its pristine purity. His most important and original theory (viz. that of Máyá) has not been clearly and accurately elucidated by the available commentaries. Under these circumstances an attempt has been made here to reconstruct his theory of Máyá independently of these commentators.

The concrete reality, the Sákshin, as described in the lecture on the Vedántic doctrine, is pure knowledge or *chit*. This knowledge is a non-dualistic,

eternal essence. It is perfect and infinite. We have seen that everything that is, is a Vivarta or appearance in it, just as the bubbles, the foam, the waves and the whirlpool are the appearances in water. Positing anything outside this is like trying to leap over one's own shoulders. According to Vedāntism knowledge does not consist of different, mutually exclusive moments like a threadless heap of flowers, as the ancient Bauddhas and the modern Humists fancy. Those who condemn the Sākshin as an abstract generalisation from these different moments forget that this very division thereof into such moments is an act of abstraction. Neither the threadless flowers nor the flowerless thread form the reality of a garland which is a string of threaded flowers. So neither the objectless soul of the Sāṅkhyas and similar schools nor the subjectless psychic or material atoms of the idealists or materialists constitute the reality of the Sākshin which is a self-witnessed infinite series of moments. The Sākshin unfolds itself by and by. The evolution of our thought is like the gradual expansion of the horizon. Never at any moment is knowledge something quite different from what it was in a previous one. This establishes the essential unity of knowledge beyond doubt.

The Sākshin has two definite faculties. It can see its whole reality which we term its epistemological faculty. It can also add, subtract, analyse, abstract, synthesise and manipulate its factors or elements. This we term its scientific faculty. The epistemological faculty (or jnāna) is often latent, while the scientific

faculty (or *vijnána*) is ordinarily active. The scientific faculty of the *Sákshin* has again three aspects or functions. It has a logical, a mathematical and a dialectical function. Supremacy of the Epistemological faculty is *Mukti* or salvation which is the real life of the *Sákshin*, while ascendancy of the Scientific faculty means bondage and delusion. The supremacy of the Epistemological faculty does not annihilate the scientific faculty. But by making the *Sákshin* witness the lower faculty from the higher and real standpoint, it simply transfers the bondage into freedom, the delusion into reality and the transience into eternity, while ascendancy of the Scientific faculty, too, cannot altogether destroy the higher faculty but only debases it for the time being. The ascendancy of the lower faculty which is termed *Máyá* or the Cosmic delusion has three stages corresponding to its three functions. Through its logical function the lower faculty of the *Sákshin* bifurcates itself into two continua, the subjective and the objective. Really the subject and the object are inseparable correlates like a substance and its qualities or like *Játi* and *Vyakti*. So, epistemologically, they constitute one being but have been logically separated into two. **This is the first or the logical stage of the cosmic delusion.** Three schools rise in this stage, the dualistic schools like the *Sánkhya*, the materialistic ones like the *Chárváka* and the purely idealistic ones (wanting in India, but often approached by *Śankara*).

Dualism recognises both the subject and the object

as separately real ; but, unable to maintain the separate reality of both, soon gives way to the Materialistic or the Idealistic monism. The spirit disintegrated into the two continua tries to evaporate one of them as useless. Thus, by turn, we get materialism and idealism, the one either forgetting idea altogether or making it a mere property of matter and the other denying matter altogether or making it an illusive appearance in the vacuum.

Separating the subject from the object, the ordinary thought divides, through its mathematical function, either both or one of these in turn into infinitesimal parts. The two continua separated from each cannot keep their unity and naturally fall into pieces. **This is the second or the mathematical stage of the cosmic delusion.** In this stage too we get three classes of philosophers, viz., (a) those who divide both the subject and the object, (b) those who divide the subject alone, and (c) those who divide the object alone. Jainism is an example of class (a), Buddhism belongs to class (b), and Kanáda belongs to class (c). Those who divide only one of the continua sometimes discard the other altogether and sometimes accept it as a unitary reality. But this is an unimportant point and does not affect our classification. But the element (whether subjective or objective) discarded by philosophers either in the logical or in the mathematical stage haunts them like a ghost and does not allow them rest. It has either to be explained away or located somewhere.

This vision of the ghost leads to the **third or the dialectic stage of the delusion**. The idealist forgets matter, and matter being somehow not a deity to pious persons but rather an *ignis fatuus* or a bewitching sorceress, is not easily missed in the theological world. But what about the subjective element? The theologian cannot forego this pure spiritual world where there is no misery arising from the contact with gross matter. This dream of his must represent a reality. But where is it to be found? In this world, impure and imperfect, there is no place for it. So they locate it beyond the sky, outside space, and higher than the highest point of the material world. This is one mode of limiting the spirit. It is throwing it away beyond the gross material world and thinking it to be extra-mundane. This mode finds favour with religious men of all denominations and is termed *Bhakti* in India. But the ordinary thought, too heavy to rest in this dreamy ultra-cosmic region, often has its balance disturbed while ruminating here, and is then in one swing sent away to the other extreme, the opposite of *Bhakti*, which is termed *Nāstikya* or Atheism in India, and is euphemistically named Positivism in Europe. The man of common sense, not credulous enough to believe in this ultra-mundane spiritual region where he would go after death, limits the spirit to the body and denies the reality of the Bhakta's dream altogether. Thus in this dialectical stage of the delusion we get two classes of thinkers—those who are theistic and those who are positivistic. Both the theist and the posi-

tivist have this in common that each picks up a special group of the materialist's or the idealist's atoms and creating a world of his own out of them lodges the spirit into it. The theist lodges his spirit in the holy ideal world and the positivist thrusts it into the unholy corporeal one. This is the only difference.

This is a short account of the action of the cosmic delusion. Informations scattered in the Vedāntic texts and the whole tenor of the Vedāntic thought imply this and this alone of all the theories, suggested up to this time, on the nature of cosmic delusion. No other theory is quite compatible with the Vedāntic teachings, if properly examined. Processes parallel to that described above are found to be going on in cases of many other delusions. A remarkable parallel is that found in the controversy on the reality of *Jāti* and *Vyakti* (as also the controversy between Nominalism and Realism). The inseparable correlates *Jāti* (or the kind) and *Vyakti* (or the individual) are first separated and are thought to be two independent realities like the subject and the object. Then, by some *Jāti* is discarded as unreal and by others *Vyakti* is rejected. In the long run, through the Platonic sublimity of the idealistic thought, *Jāti* is deified like the subject and then a search for it is commenced in right earnest. The idealist lodges it in the world of pure realities with God, while the uncultured man tries to find it in a sheath or a part of the individual, and not succeeding in finding it anywhere in the body of the individual, sometimes makes the ludicrous effort of lodging it in

a mere symbol. Just as the innocent Bhakta, not finding his God anywhere in the world, puts Him into an image, so the Tárkika not finding the Jāti of a twice-born person in any part of his body locates it in the sacred thread and tells you in his technical language that by an examination of Anvaya and Vyatireka, he has determined the man's Jāti to lie in the thread, with which he is recognized as twice-born and without which he is a Śudra.

By modifying Condillac's living statue we would just get a facsimile of the spirit infatuated by the Cosmic Delusion. Imagine the statue to have a mirror-like outer-coating all over its body instead of the dull marble supplied by the French Philosopher. As soon as the hard coating over the eyes of the statue is removed and its neck only is allowed to move, it will find in its different limbs many different images of its body. It will naturally identify its whole being with this or that of these images in turn. The spirit under the influence of Mâyā behaves just like that and identifies itself with this or that body which is at best only a limited image of it.

CHAPTER IX.

ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

In the Vedic times the Rishis had a dim vision of One Supreme Being that manifests itself as Indra, Varuna, Mitra, Agni, etc., “इन्द्रमित्रवरुणमग्निमाहुः” But the idea remained quite vague. The idea was transformed into a clear metaphysical conception by the Upanishads. But the Upanishadic God is, as we have seen, a metaphysical reality and not a personal being acceptable to theologians. In the post-Upanishadic systems the idea of a personal God is present for the first time in the Yoga-sūtras of Patanjali. From Patanjali it appears to have been borrowed by the compilers of the ancient theological text known under the name of Nārada-pancharātra. It was from the same source borrowed and modified to some extent by the followers of Kanāda and Gautama. The only difference between the Pancharātras and the Tārrikas was that the former were influenced by the Bhāgavata-theology as developed in the wonderful Vaishnava text called Śrīmadbhāgavata (which is an embodiment of poetry, mythology, philosophy and theology in one), while the latter were influenced by the Śaiva-theology originating in Kashmir. Patanjali's conception of God was acceptable to every Bhakta, whether Vaishnava, Śaiva or Śākta. His definition of God “लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः” is essentially that

accepted by every theologian from the earliest times to the present.

But Patanjali's personal view of God, though quite agreeable to the poetic mind of the theologian, was far from being acceptable to the positivistic bent of the Scientist or to the searching criticism of the Philosopher. The scientist represented by the Tántrika in this country recognised only matter and force, and matter being too gross for an apotheosis, force or *Sakti* became his Supreme Goddess. The Philosopher could not recognise the actual existence of anything but his Metaphysical reality and his God was identical with it. Thus, we get three main views of God, viz., the Theological or the Personal view, the Scientific or the Force view and the Philosophical or the Reality view. The Force view having, in time, degenerated in India into the obscene Kaula cult and the Reality view too deep for the popular intelligence having never found favour with the common folk, the Personal view alone came to be regarded as the theistic doctrine in the proper sense of the word. The Personal view of God has been the favourite doctrine of the ordinary theologian not only in this country but almost in every part of the world that has got a theology at all.

Vedántism proper upholds the Reality view of God. The sectarian doctrines whose propounders try to base them on different interpretations of the *Brahma-sútras* of Bádaráyana are really non-Vedántic and mostly accept a Personal view of God in one form or another. The Reality view of God has been maintained

throughout these lectures and it has been already explained in detail. The Force view was never fully developed in its purity in this country owing to the imperfect culture and rapid degeneration of the physical sciences here. Even in other countries this view has rarely found favour with thinkers. Theology being too metaphorical for the Reality view and too pious for the Force view, has in every country accepted the Personal view of God. Sceptical and positivistic attacks being often directed against this theological doctrine, its supporters have tried to adduce numerous arguments to support it. These arguments explaining proofs of the existence of God are too many to be stated in detail or fully examined in a brief lecture like this. It is convenient, therefore, to adopt some classification of these proofs and, then, to examine each class briefly. Kant's classification being in a somewhat modified sense applicable even to the Indian proofs of the Existence of God, we propose to adopt it here. The German philosopher thinks that all the arguments supporting the existence of God can be classified under three heads. They are either Cosmological, or Ontological or Teleological. To be more clear we might call them the physical, the logical and the moral arguments for the existence of God. In Indian Philosophy, the Tárkika proof of God's existence falls under the first head. Vedántism often sticks to the second, if it becomes theological at all. The third is favoured by the Sánkhyas.

The Tárkika's proof of the existence of God is

based on the postulate that every effect must have a cause. The world is an effect and so it must have a cause. But no cosmic cause can by hypothesis produce the world taken as a whole out of its raw materials. So the Tárkika posits an extracosmic entity whom he terms *Íśvara* to be the efficient cause of the world and *paramāṇus* or atoms to be its material cause. A perceptual analysis of the world supplied four kinds of atoms to Kanāda and, assuming that parts precede the whole, he built his world out of these atoms. His followers supplied an architect to build the world out of the terrestrial, aerial, aquatic and fiery atoms. This architect was thought to have a vague similarity to the individual soul, and as it was conceived to be supreme in power, it came to be known under the name of *Paramātman* in the later Tárkika works. The causal postulate implies in another way also the existence of God. Every effect is produced by its cause. This would lead, some think, to a series of causes and the term that begins the series is thought to be God. Anyhow God is thought to be under this argument the ultimate self-produced (*Svayambhú*) cause of the world.

The ontological argument for the existence of God depends upon the psychological fact that one can have no notion of what has no existence at all. In two ways this argument leads to a conception of God. Every one is ordinarily thought by its upholders to have an idea of perfection, infinity and other divine attributes. It is also urged that these ideas are posi-

tive and are negated in the notions of imperfection, finiteness, etc. If, then, there is no infinite being, how could we have an idea of it? Again, those who propound the Reality-view of God think that every fact of knowledge implies real existence, be it of knowledge itself, if of nothing else. This real existence is God. These two phases of this argument are respectively adopted by the Cartesians and the Hegelians. Vedántism combines these and, proving that the infinite ontal reality, posited by the facts of knowledge, is nothing but our own self, boldly asserts that this self or *आत्मन्* is the Brahman and that there ought to be no search for an ultra-psyhic Brahman.

The teleological argument is based on the Ethical postulate according to which the notion of right and wrong implanted in human nature implies a person to whom this responsibility refers. The idea of duty is an undoubted fact of the human mind. This idea is meaningless, if there is no person to whom the agent be responsible for the performance of this duty. This person to whom man is responsible is God. Again, not only the notion of duty but the implied existence of a purpose in the world would necessitate the existence of an Omniscient Intelligence. This is expressed laconically in the old Sánkhyā formula which says that all combinations refer to something else for which they exist. *संघातस्य परार्थत्वम् ।*

Thus, putting together all these arguments, it would appear that we have reason to believe in the existence of an Omniscient and Omnipotent Intelligence

that creates and regulates the world. Now, it remains to see whether the arguments advanced to prove the existence of God can stand criticism and, if so, what they really prove. The first argument is beset with many difficulties. The world being an effect requires a cause, the Tárkika and his fellow-thinkers suppose. The Tárkika asserts further the necessity of three causes for everything, viz., the Samaváyikárana (the inherent cause), the Asamaváyikárana (the non-inherent cause) and the Nimittakárana (the efficient cause). The atoms are the material or inherent cause of the world and God is its efficient cause, he thinks. Now, those who do not accept a God deny the necessity of an efficient cause for anything. The world evolves out of its materials (the atoms or whatever they be) without an agent's help according to them. In other words, owing to the force immanent in the world, the succeeding moment follows the preceding without any external efficiency. These thinkers are called Naturalists (Svabhávavádins). Besides, the syllogism of the Tárkikas that the world has an efficient cause for it is an effect जगत्सकर्तृकम् कार्यत्वात् has many technical defects. Before accepting the conclusion, we ought to be satisfied that the world is an effect or Kárya. The Tárkikas often define a Kárya either in such a way that it becomes synonymous with Sakartrika and their argument, then, involves a *petitio principii*—सिद्धसाधनम्—or, they are altogether unable to prove that the world is an effect and then the *hetu* (Kâryatvât) becomes Asiddha. Moreover, this argu-


ment involves an Upādhi (*vide supra*, on the *pramānas*). Just as in the fallacious reasoning—The hill has smoke because it has fire—we have “burning wet fuel” as an Upādhi which makes it invalid, for not all fire has smoke but only fire that burns wet fuel, so the reasoning जगत्सकलं कार्यत्वात् falls to have जन्तुजन्यत्वं as an Upādhi. Not all affects but only those made by animals are seen to have an efficient agent. This जन्तुजन्यत्वं or being the work of an animal comes under the definition of an Upādhi; for all effects not necessarily being works of an animal, it is साधनाव्यापक or not more extensive than the reason and, at the same time, it is साध्यसमव्याप्तिक or exactly co-extensive with the conclusion as just only the works of animals necessarily require efficient agents to produce them. These are mere hints on the fallacious nature of the Tārkika’s argument to prove the existence of God. A detailed examination of it would require a separate volume bigger than this manual.

Then, we come in order to the ontological argument. But as this argument essentially differs from the other two and lends support only to the Reality—view of God we propose to examine it last of all and busy ourselves with the other remaining argument. The teleological argument presumes that a definite purpose is found everywhere in the world and also that the notion of right and wrong in the human mind implies the existence of a person to whom man is responsible. Now both these presumptions are, in the first instance, unwarranted in themselves and, then, even

if the premises are granted, the conclusions drawn from these do not actually follow. The Sāṅkhyas accept that all definite combinations are for some person, but from this premise they do not conclude the existence of God. All natural combinations are for the numberless individuals (*purushas*) according to them and there is no necessity of a Supreme Being. Thus, they think that there is no reason why we should accept the existence of God (ईश्वरसिद्धिः). As for the ethical phase of the argument, the Sāṅkhyas emphatically assert that all human action is to be referred either to self-interest or sympathy (स्वार्थकारणव्याप्त्या सर्वे कार्ये व्याप्तम्) and, thus, Divine justice is not necessary to explain the ethical distinction in actions at all.

The two arguments thus falling, we come to the Ontological argument now. We have already seen that this argument like the others has more than one form. In the Cartesian form, it is not acceptable to Vedāntism. The mere idea of infinity cannot prove the ontal existence of an infinite being. Kant is right when he remarks that the conclusion in this case is no better than inference of the objective existence of a certain sum from the mere idea of it in a mendicant's mind. There are many other objections against this argument in this form and all need not be mentioned in a brief review like this. But, in the Hegelian form, the argument was long ago accepted by Śāṅkara and his followers. Deny everything. But you cannot deny the existence of knowledge. Denial of everything would itself imply the existence of knowledge or Chit and this Chit is the

Brahman. We have already seen that this Chit is not individual and transitory, but universal and eternal and, so, we do not examine the real nature of it again here.



CHAPTER X.

TRANSMIGRATION, AFTER-LIFE AND MUKTI.

The idea of an after-life is almost universal. It is common to both the savage and the civilized man. We dream of the persons we have often seen even after their death, and, as there is nothing in the world that impresses us so much as living personalities, we are unable to think that these dreams are mere illusions. To the primitive man it was quite impossible to think that vivid dream of a dead person did not imply his existence somewhere else or even in his former neighbourhood in some etherial form that appeared and disappeared at will. Spencer's Ghost theory is ridiculed by many. But, in fact, it explains much that is otherwise unintelligible in the worlds of mythology and theology. In dreams we have the origin of Ghosts. Dreams and hallucinations which are nothing but waking dreams lead us to form an idea of Ghosts or etherial images of the departed persons. This idea of Ghosts and the idea of a soul living in the body just as a bird lives in a cage render mutual help to each other. The soul liberated from the gross earthly body is considered by the ordinary people to somehow form or secure other bodies or even to wander without any body at all in the worlds of Ghosts and spirits, and visit thence her earthly relations, more particularly if she lacks peace and com-

fort in those regions of the dead. There is essentially no difference between the savage who believes the ghosts of his departed ancestors to live in the valleys or hills or in regions beyond the sky or in the nether worlds and the men of refined thought who think that the souls liberated from the earthly bodies go and live an eternal life in a spiritual world which can not be definitely located. Philosophically, both stand on the same footing as we shall see presently.

On life hereafter there have been three views, viz., the mythical, the religious and the philosophical. These three views appear almost everywhere in a chronological order. In India the mythical view had its beginning in the pre-Vedic times and, still, lingers among the people. According to their view, dead men go to other worlds similar to this, but either more terrible or more pleasant, known as Naraka and Svarga. They assume other bodies in those worlds and suffer pain or enjoy pleasures according to their deserts. This view is perfectly anthropomorphic. Then, we come to the religious view which prevails at present only outside India. According to this view, the spirits of the dead after leaving the present body go to other worlds where they are either eternally condemned to pain or allowed to enjoy bliss for ever according to their deserts. The spirits do not assume other bodies in after-life under this view and never come back to earth. This is the only difference between the first and the second views. But philosophy accepts neither of these views. The spirit flying from one body to another,

just as a bird flies from one tree to another, or shooting like a meteor with a parabolic orbit into the infinite space, never to come back after liberation from the present bondage, are conceptions incompatible with rational thought, and so says Yājñavalkya in the Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa “नम्रेत्य संशक्तिः”. The Rishi has plainly said that there is no consciousness after death. Consciousness and life are co-extensive, nay identical, and hence the one disappearing, the other cannot remain.

There are two distinct standpoints from which we can study life, viz., the Scientific standpoint and the Philosophical one. Vedāntism recognises these two as such and never confounds them like other systems. Scientifically, every individual life has a beginning and an end in time. It has also a definite limitation in space. My life, physical and mental, began with the birth of my body, has a history of its own quite distinct from those of others, and will have an end when this body is disintegrated. It cannot be proved that this very life which belonged to this body will either remain in a pure bodiless spiritual state, as some think, or attach itself to another body as others fancy. If there is any subsequent life that is anyhow physiologically connected with our present one, it is that of our progeny, and, so the Śruti says “आत्मा वै पुनरावर्त्तते”. Then, there are microscopic and even grosser lives given birth to by the putrefaction of our bodies which might be thought to be related to these. But it is a universally known fact that the difference of body constitutes a difference

of life, whether two bodies are related genetically or not, and, therefore, one's life is not identical with that of creatures produced from one's own body. This being a stern fact, how could the same soul be thought to have successively many bodies or more than one life (one here and one hereafter) as pious men have fancied? Thus, we see that a spiritual life hereafter is as much a work of fancy as the mythical theory of transmigration. The soul can neither be separated from one body nor joined to another body.

The above is a brief account of the Scientific view of life. It starts from the body and concludes the non-existence of the soul as a substance independent of matter. It reduces the spirit to a property of matter. This view is, of course, far from being acceptable to all. Philosophy cannot accept anything without examination. We have already seen that it starts from the fact of knowledge and not from any known individual fact, whether it is the body or anything else. We have also seen that, starting from knowledge, we find that the body is as much an appearance to the Sākshin as anything else. But even under this view the soul cannot be thought either to be travelling from one body to another or leading a life of eternal bliss or condemnation after leaving this body, while preserving its personality. The religious consolation that we shall live with our lost relatives in another world is a delusory hope and can never be fulfilled. Our personality is lost with this body. Consistent Vedāntism, of course having nothing to do with the Upanishadic mythology,

does not recognise an after-life in any of the above senses. According to it, Abhimána is the cause of bondage. The Sákshin which is really the Universal Spirit has falsely limited itself to this or that particular body and is, thus, living in bondage. As soon as this Abhimána disappears, the spirit is free. Why did it bind itself in this way? This question is illegitimate and can have no answer. No science can say why a thing is so and so but only how things are. We find the Sákshin to be bound. We find him on examination to be really free. This much we can say. But why the Sákshin bound himself is beyond the scope of Philosophy. This is the meaning of the ancient sage who says—

“को अद्वा वेद क इह प्रवोचत् शुभ आजाता कुतश्च विस्मृष्टः। अर्वाग्देवा
अस्य विसर्जनेन अथ कोवेद यन आबभूव। यो अस्याध्यजः परमेष्ठ्येन सो अद्वा
वेद यदि वा न वेद”।

Mukti means removal of this Abhimána from himself by the Sákshin. Birth and death and a thousand other troubles occurring to body are attributed to himself by the Sákshin. Recovering his true self, the Sákshin gets free from all this trouble. Being Sarva-bhútátma-bhútátman, it can have nothing to lose and nothing to gain, all being in it “न मे पार्थास्ति कर्तव्यं त्रिषु लोकेषु
किंचन। नामवाप्तमवाप्तव्यम्”। Bodies or special combinations of matter are appearing now and then. There is no scarcity of them and the Sákshin will attach itself to this or that of these as long as he has Abhimána, just as a person having a desire for a house or a piece of land will secure another house or piece of land after leaving what he had. But, just as the person who has

killed his desire for a particular thing can never have the thing again, so the Sākshin after killing his Abhimāna can not attach itself to another body after the disintegration of the present one. Cosmic life, according to Vedāntism, is the duration of the Sākshin's *abhimāna*. True life of the Sākshin means disappearance of a knowledge of this Abhimāna as such. Except the above two, there is no other mode of life and, thus, we see that a life here and a life hereafter, assigned to the individual, is a mere poetical fancy.

The Vedāntin wants Mukti not for the individual soul which is chimerical but for the Sākshin with whom he considers himself to be identical. Thus, scientifically every life has a beginning and an end on earth and can have no projection of it hereafter, and, philosophically, there is only one real life of the Sākshin, all-embracing and eternal, in which there is no question of a here and a hereafter.

If the Vedāntic theory is consistently maintained, all that has been said in the Upanishads about the different fates of those who perform the Vedic rites with knowledge, of those who do the same without knowledge, and of those who are of neither description, and much that is similar in the other religious texts, is either to be rejected as an idle fancy or to be interpreted allegorically. Ignorance and sin lead even in this life to results worse than the filthiest imaginable Naraka, while knowledge and virtue secure even here purer bliss than that of the highest Svarga. Why, then, should a preacher of morality seek the

help of these fancies ? Not imaginary bliss hereafter but Jívan-mukti ought to be the aim of every sane person and in the lecture that follows we propose to treat of this final goal of a Philosopher.

CHAPTER XI.

TRUE ASCETICISM AND JIVAN-MUKTI.

Even Vedāntists like Śankara have proclaimed in their zeal that asceticism is incompatible with a householder's life. But a study of the old Vedāntic texts like the Gītā or the Upanishads and the whole tenor of the system would clearly show that the real fact is quite otherwise. Vedāntic thought and Vedāntic life are not for this or that class of persons. Vedāntism is an impartial and universal religion. It is perfectly rational in its procedure and is altogether free from sectarianism. These facts would be quite plain to every one who has studied the early Vedāntic texts carefully. It is, therefore, perfectly wrong to connect Vedāntic life to any external circumstances. A recluse and business-man, a Brāhmana and a Śūdra, are equally entitled to lead a Vedāntic life, if they have a desire for it. Śankara himself says, in an impartial mood, that only the possession of the four *sādhana*s is required for admission to Vedāntism. These *sādhana*s are :—1. Distinguishing things eternal from those that are transitory, 2. Want of eagerness to enjoy the pleasures of life, 3. Possession of calmness, self-control, etc., and 4. A wish to have Mukti. If a person has these four Sādhana's, he can receive the Vedāntic initiation, whether he possesses any other qualification or not. Thus Śankara says as plainly as he

could in one place, but elsewhere he has modified this statement without sufficient reason by saying that persons belonging to some particular classes cannot receive the Vedāntic initiation. This modification is quite unreasonable and cannot be accepted. True asceticism or Sannyāsa which is the characteristic of the Vedāntic life is not an external renunciation of the world. This is neither possible nor desirable. Asceticism enjoined by Vedāntism is a mental act. Live in the world but have no attachment for it. A man of business, like Janaka or Yājñavalkya doing the duties that come to him naturally but having no particular attachment for anything worldly, is far superior to the apparent ascetic, who living in the forest, is always thinking of the worldly pleasures and is seduced as soon as temptations present themselves to him. Such a person is not a real ascetic and is stigmatised as a hypocrite in the Bhagavad-Gītā which says “बाह्येन्द्रियाणि संयम्य यः शीतमनसात्सरन् । इन्द्रियाथार्तान् विमूढात्मा मिथ्याचारः स उच्यते” ।

All relations have a reference to the body. A son, a wife, wealth and all other possessions belong to the body. The Spirit (or the Sākshin) has nothing to do with these. It has falsely identified itself with a particular body and, therefore, regards these as his possessions. Asceticism does not consist in making the body renounce these possessions. The body requires these absolutely to a certain extent and it must have them. But the Spirit ought not to be after these. To let the body do its instructive work and to have nothing to do with its forced and artificial needs is real Sann-

yāsa. “शरीरं केवलं कर्म कुर्वन्नपि न लिप्यते” is the declaration of the Gīta. Just as a man identifying himself with another person, say a wife, a son or a friend, gets into troubles on their account, though he himself be otherwise quite happy, so the Spirit identifying itself with the body gets into troubles on the latter's account, though it is naturally happy. To get free from these self-imposed troubles, the spirit need not renounce the body or the bodily possessions. Just as a man living in a public house has not much care for the house ; for he thinks that the house does not belong to him, so the Spirit even without renouncing the world has no particular concern with it as soon as it transcends the bodily standpoint and reaches the higher universal standpoint so often described in these pages. All human relations are mental. A man may or may not have occupied or even seen a house in a remote island but may still regard himself as its owner after forming a relation with it either by purchasing it or otherwise. The house, of course, remains the same after the purchase as before that. But the new owner who would have indifferently received news of its destruction by fire or lightning a few minutes before the purchase was made would naturally faint, if he heard such news now. Again, let us have another example. Suppose a child is born to a king and is at once exchanged for her own babe by a nurse in attendance with a hope to see her own son one day on the throne. The two children grow up. The King's real son becomes a traveller and lives in a distant land, while the

nurse's real son known under the name of the heir-apparent to the throne lives near the king. Fancy that in his 16th year the heir-apparent gets dangerously ill and his father is deeply anxious about him. The nurse, the real mother of the prince, too, suddenly falls ill and is on death-bed. She confesses everything. Now, the king comes to know that the pseudo-prince is not his son but was born of the nurse and that his own real son lives in a distant land. What changes would at once come over the King? He who would have given his own life to save the dying boy in his house now leaves him to fate and, at once, sets out in search of the wandering lad who is now known to be his real son. The boys remain the same. But the mental attitude of the father is quite changed. Every worldly relation is similarly dependent on our mind. Think a thing to be yours and you are in trouble for it. Be indifferent to it and you can have no trouble on its account. The Vedāntin is, therefore, enjoined to be indifferent to everything. His body does mechanically what it has been accustomed to do. He does not care much for that. If except what is absolutely needed for the maintenance of his body, he does anything at all, it is for the sake of the universal good. He is even in these things indifferent to success or failure. Nature is doing her business and our bodies which are factors of nature contribute their share of the whole. The Sākshin is an indifferent witness. There is no going against nature "प्रकृतियानि भूतानि निवृद्धः किं करिष्यति." All successes and failures alike have their

use in nature. The Sákshin ought to be indifferent to these “समः सिद्धार्थसिद्धौ च समत्वं योगचक्षते” ।

This Yoga-state as described above is also termed Jívan-mukti. It is a recovery of its own true nature by the Sákshin. This Mukti is not attained by going to Vaikuntha, as many suppose. It is not attained by performing this or that religious rite, as others fancy. It is not a matter of feeling, as still others think. Actions can produce only material changes, for activity is, according to Vedántism, a property of matter. So, actions cannot affect the spirit and, thus, we leave Karmakánda to take care of itself. An emotional state like Bhakti depends partially upon the will of man and partially upon the merit of the beloved object. It may be delusive, for the object may be really unworthy of the high love you entertain for it. We see, then, that neither Karma nor Upásaná can give us permanent satisfaction. Action and emotion being thus of little help in the restoration of the Spirit to its true state, only one course is left to man, viz., that of knowledge, and we have already seen that Mukti is actually a matter of knowledge. Look at the world from the ordinary perceptual standpoint and you are in bondage. You think that your real self is limited to the body and this delusion leads to infinite troubles. But as soon as you attain to the higher standpoint and realise the fact that the body is a mere speck in the world of appearances that rise out of, and disappear into, the Sákshin, you are free from all bondage and are a Jívan-mukta.

This is a brief account of Jívan-mukti. How a Jívan-mukta lives in the world and deals with it will be described in the next lecture.

CHAPTER XII.

LIFE OF A VEDANTIN.

We have seen that Vedántism is not an anti-ethical or a non-ethical doctrine. It is a theory of living freedom (Jivan-mukti) based on a critical examination of our own knowledge. Thus, it is at once a theory of knowledge and of life. The Socratic maxim (Know thyself) has perhaps found no better parallel than the "Thou art that" of Vedántism. Self-examination is our great principle and freedom even in this life (or Jivan-mukti) is our great end. Our epistemology shews that just as waves rise in an ocean, so waves of experience rise in the spirit. We have seen how we separate the subject and the object, just as we logically distinguish a quality from a substance or an angle from the angled thing, though they are really one and the same thing, and, then, forgetting one of the falsely distinguished elements, the subject, which is a principle of unity, we shatter the objective world into pieces till we reach atoms. We have also seen that sometimes we forget the other factor, the object, and resolve the subject into pieces and get the momentary ideas. Thus, pulverising the subjective and the objective worlds separately to atoms, we begin to reconstruct a unity for ourselves and limit the totality of our being to a group of these material and psychic atoms known as our body, strangely neglecting other groups of almost the same type. This limitation of

the infinite to the finite has been characterised as *Máyá*. Life in *Máyá* is the source of all partialism and evidently antagonistic to what we may term totalism in absence of a better name. *Máyá* leading to partialism is the source of all contradictions and conflicting views in ontology, in epistemology, in theology and in ethics. The ontological controversy whether the world is one continuous extension made up of atoms, the epistemological question whether there is one soul or only momentary ideas, the theological contention whether God is in the world or outside it and the ethical conflict between egoism and altruism, are all due to this *Máyá*. Owing to *Máyá* the mind has no peace and is ever vacillating from one extreme to another.

The Vedántin, by transcending *Máyá*, acquires perfect peace and reconciles all contradiction. He rejects all partial views which arise after the limitation of the soul to the body. In short, he is totalistic in everything. He takes into view existence as a whole and discards all partialistic views. To him the subject and the object are aspects of the same Being, and, thus, the conflict between monism and atomism (subjective or objective) appears to be meaningless, for the very conception of atoms and transitory ideas is possible only if subject and object are totally separated. So, inside and outside have no meaning at all except with reference to a particular body. In consideration of existence as a whole no such questions can arise. Finally, egoism and altruism disappear from the Vedán-

tin's view for he acts for the world as a whole, neither egoistically sacrificing others for his body nor the latter for others, but has the harmonious development of the whole for his end, if he ever concerns himself with the world at all.

Thus, transcending *Máyá* and having a perfect peace of mind the Vedántin leads an ideal life. Intellectual rest and physical simplicity, moral impartiality and spiritual satisfaction are the characteristics of the Vedántin's life. There are two and only two perfect ideals for him. He may follow either the life of Janaka or that of Bharata. No rites are prescribed for a real Vedántin. He is an actual Sannyásin whether he leads externally the life of a householder or abandons the household affairs and takes to retirement. If he leads a householder's life, he is said to be a *yogin* like Janaka. If he leaves the household affairs and retires, he is said to be a *paramahansa*. There are many other minor ideals, Kutichaka, Vaikhánasa, etc., which need not be mentioned here. The two great ideals of a Vedántin are recognised by the *Gítá* and other authentic works. But Śankara and his followers discard the Janaka ideal and ridicule it in their ascetic zeal, while their later disciples have founded a systematic hierarchy of Sannyásins with rules and rites and monopolies like those of the mediæval monastic monks. The modern *sannyásins* and their numerous imitators are really professional monks without knowledge.

The real Vedántin, we have said, is either a *yogin*


or a *paramahansa*. The difference between these two is a superficial one. The one is a householder, while the other is a recluse. Their convictions are the same. Janaka was an emperor and Bharata an ascetic, but both were men of real knowledge. To such men, whatever be the external conditions of their life, pain and pleasure, misery and happiness, gain and loss are all phenomenal waves in the eternal ocean of knowledge. They are never moved by these changes. If through previous associations the body and mind are affected by external changes, even then they are themselves quite unmoved and witness these changes as indifferent spectators. The man of the Janaka ideal is placed by circumstances in the midst of worldly affairs, while the one of the Bharata ideal has few worldly duties and takes to retirement. Both do what comes before them. Hunting after virtue or sin is equally alien to them. They see that the body works like so many other things in the world. They do not identify themselves with the body and never run after it. The body is allowed by them what is barely necessary for its maintenance, and it is made to work for the welfare of the whole world, if it hankers after work.

The above is a sketch of what a Vedāntin's life ought to be. Now, a few remarks are to be made here on the compatibility of the theory of Mukti with that of Karman. It appears to some religious critics that under the *Karma* theory of the Indian Theology, it is altogether impossible for man to ever attain liberation. One Karman produces ten thousand others just as a

seed produces myriads of similar seeds. See once the face of Jagannátha and you become a Bráhmāna not less than one hundred times. Commit a Mahápátaka and you have to reap its fruits during countless lives. Thus, we see that a single act of virtue or of sin leads to numerous lives as fertile as the present one, and *karman* multiplying like a bacillus in this way, how can there be freedom from this burden? This objection appears to be unanswerable at first sight. But, on a critical examination, it appears to be quite puerile. Vedántism has satisfactorily proved, as we have already seen, that knowledge is the essence of the Spirit. Action is delusory in its nature, if referred to the Spirit, and belongs only to the body. The false identification of the Spirit with the body, or rather with the imaginary ghost fancied to occupy the body, leads to the Mímánsaka theory of transmigration according to which the soul with its ever increasing burden of *karman* travels from one body to another, just as a bird flies from one tree to another. But under the Abhimána view of transmigration (see the last two chapters), this burden of *karman* is delusory. It belongs really to the body and is falsely ascribed to the soul as has already been shown. The soul is, therefore, really free according to Vedántism, and the bugbear of *karman* loses its frightening power before a Vedántin.

As for the question as to what becomes of the *karman* of a Vedántin, we have a ready answer in the Upanishads which say “तस्य पुनः दायमुपयन्ति सुहृदः साधुकृत्यां द्विवत्तः पापकृत्याम्” Every one's actions have a double effect. They

affect in a certain way the body from which they issue and also other bodies that come into contact. They do not produce an effect at all on an indifferent person. For example, if I strike a man, this action would exhaust my nerves and injure the man struck. A really indifferent witness has no harm or benefit from the action. So the Vedāntin realising his nature as the impartial, perfect Sákshin, indifferent to the actions of the world, has nothing to do with them. Action issuing from his body or other bodies will affect the bodies and their surroundings ; but the Vedāntin, no longer ascribing these things to himself, is quite free from these effects. We have seen that his body will instinctively perform only the acts necessary to maintain itself. Those wicked persons, who may happen to dislike his body or envy it, may fancy themselves to be injured by it and, thus, would reap the fruits of his body's vicious nature (पापकृत्या); while those who may like his body and render service to it, now and then, would be always pleased with it, and this pleasure would be an effect of his good nature (साधुकृत्या). In other words, his instinctive goodness would please good men and the very respect shown to him by others may tease the envious and wicked men, but neither has any effect on the Spirit. Voluntarily, he tries neither to please nor to displease others. If such a man is ever led to do anything beyond what is required for the bare maintenance of the body, it would be an act for the good of the whole world.





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